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The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly:
The Limitation of Defendants' Statutory Rights
by Judicial Decisions and Legislative Revisions
Matthew S. T. Clark*
L Introduction
When the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Commonwealth v. Baker,'
the criminal defense bar rejoiced that the court was willing to read section
16.1-263(A) of the Code of Virginia in such a manner that favored criminal
defendants.2 The cheers quickly became jeers as the General Assembly of
Virginia amended the statute, enacted a statute to limit Baker, and the
Supreme Court of Virginia limited its previous ruling.3 This process of
narrowing a criminal defendant's rights, whether statutory or constitutional,
is all too common of an occurrence during the past twenty years in the
Commonwealth.
This article will trace the history of certain statutes, examine judicial
treatment of these statutes, and discuss the General Assembly's subsequent
amendments of the statutes in response to the courts' decisions. Part II will
focus on Commonwealth v. Baker and its progeny, showing how juvenile
defendants' rights have diminished due to limited holdings and significant
revisions of various sections of the Virginia Code. Part fI1 will highlight the
changes of Virginia Code section 19.2-187, dealing with the introduction of
* J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
University of Virginia. Thank you to my parents for their love and teaching and to the rest
of my family and friends for keeping me sane.
1. 516 S.E.2d 219 (Va. 1999).
2. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 516 S.E.2d 219, 219 (Va. 1999) (per curiam) (super-
seded by amendment to statute) (holding that plain reading of statute required notification
to both parents); 1997 Va. Acts ch. 441.
3. See 1999 Va. Acts ch. 952 (amending S 16.1-263(A) to "at least one parent" instead
of "parents"); VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-269.1(E) (Michie 2000) (stating that indictment in
circuit court cures defect or error in any proceeding in juvenile court, except with respect to
juvenile's age); Moore v. Commonwealth, 527 S.E.2d 415,418 (Va. 2000) (holding that section
16.1-269.1 (E) cured defect created by Commonwealth's failure to adhere strictly to 16.1-263).
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certificates of analysis.4 In Part IV, the ever-changing definitions of words
and phrases within Virginia Code Section 19.2-295.1, which describes the
procedure that the Commonwealth must use to introduce prior criminal
convictions during the sentencing phase, will be discussed.' These analyses
will reveal the limiting and confining nature of criminal law in Virginia and
should cause us to question to what extent these limitations have redefined
the burden on criminal defendants.
II. The Dwindling of Statutory Protectionfor Juveniles
A. Courts Acknowledge the Commonwealth's
Failure to Follow Its Own Rules
In Commonwealthv. Bakerthe Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
Commonwealth's failure to issue a summons to the juvenile defendant's
father voided the juvenile defendant's convictions because the circuit court
lacked authority to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.6 The court based its
decision on section 16.1-263(A) of the Virginia Code, which at that time
read in part as follows: "After a petition has been filed, the court shall direct
the issuance of summonses, one directed to the juvenile, if the juvenile is
twelve or more years of age, and another to the parents."7 The meaning of
the statute appeared to be clear; it required the juvenile court to issue sum-
monses to both parents in order for the court to transfer its subject matter
jurisdiction to the circuit court
In its one page opinion, the court noted that section 16.1-263(A) was
"amended effective July 1, 1999 to provide for notice to 'at least one
parent.'"' This point is of great interest because the Court of Appeals of
Virginia had decided in favor of Baker on September 15, 1998."0 Thus, in
less than one year, the General Assembly had sought to remedy the failure
of the Commonwealth to adhere strictly to the juvenile transfer procedure
set out in section 16.1-263 by amending the statute clearly to mean that a
4. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-187 (Michie 2000).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-295.1 (Michie 2000).
6. Baker, 516 S.E.2d at 219.
7. 1997 Va. Acts ch. 441.
8. Some exceptions to this mandatory phrasing were included in section 16.1-263 in
its 1997 form. These exceptions included waiver of service by written stipulation or volun-
tary appearance by the parents and a certification on record by the judge that the identity of
a parent was not "reasonably ascertainable." See 1997 Va. Acts ch. 441.
9. Baker, 516 S.E.2d at 219 (citing 1999 Va. Acts ch. 952).
10. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 504 S.E.2d 394, 399 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (superseded
by amendment to statute) Qholding that notice of allegation that juvenile committed delin-
quent act must be given to both parents if their identity is reasonably ascertainable).
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juvenile court need only notify one parent of the initiation of juvenile
proceedings. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that "retro-
spective application" of the Baker holding was mandated by Gogley v.
Peyton,"" thereby rejecting the Commonwealth's hope that the ruling be
prospective only.12
B. The Court's Solution to the Cbmmonwealth's Problem
After the court's holding in Baker, there came a flood of appeals by
defendants who had been convicted as juveniles, most notably Steve Edward
Roach and Douglas Christopher Thomas, both of whom had been con-
victed of capital murder. 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia erected a dam
with its ruling in Moore (Dennis) v. Commonwealth ("Moore I"). "' In this
case the court held that section 16.1-269.1 (E) cured the Commonwealth's
failure to notify the defendant's father of the transfer hearing." The section
reads in part as follows: "An indictment in the circuit court cures any error
or defect in any proceeding held in the juvenile court except with respect to
the juvenile's age.'1 6 The court stated that this "curative statutory provision
permitted the circuit court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction and to
try the defendant on the offenses set forth in the indictments."17 Although
the court noted that the defendant did not raise this issue at trial or on direct
appeal, the court's broad holding makes it appea as though section 16.1-
269. 1(E) would cure the defect despite a defendant's proper preservation of
the issue." Given this case, the Commonwealth found relief from the flood
of litigation caused by its failure to follow proper procedure in juvenile cases
involving offenses committed after July 1, 1996.
11. 160 S.E.2d 746 (Va. 1968).
12. Commonwealth v. Baker, 516 S.E.2d 219, 219 (Va. 1999) (per curiam); see Gogley
v. Peyton, 160 S.E. 746, 747-48 (Va. 1968) (holding that statutory procedures regarding
preliminary hearings for juveniles are mandatory and jurisdictional). For a general discussion
of Baker and its effects on statutory rights of juvenile defendants, see Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.,
Legal Issues Involving Children, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001 (1999).
13. SeeRoachv. Director, Dep!t of Corrections, 522 S.E.2d 869,872 (Va. 1999) (holding
* that defendant's mother received adequate notice); Thomas v. Garraghty, 522 S.E.2d 865, 868
(Va. 1999) (holding that defendant's biological father was not "parent" at time of transfer
hearing).
14. Moore (Dennis) v. Commonwealth, 527 S.E.2d 415 (Va. 2000).
15. Id. at 418; see 1996 Va. Acts chs. 755, 914.
16. VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-269.1(E) (Michie 2000).
17. Moore, 527 S.E.2d at 418.
18. See id. at 417.
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In Moore (David) v. Commonwealth ("Moore II")19 the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that section 16.1-269.6(E) "does not operate to cure or waive
the initial defect in the juvenile court proceedings where, as here, the juve-
nile court fails to give the parental notice of the initiation of juvenile court
proceedings as statutorily mandated."0 The section reads as follows: "Any
objection to the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to this article shall
be waived if not made before arraignment."" The Commonwealth argued
that David Moore's failure to object in a timely fashion procedurally barred
him from raising an objection to the trial court's jurisdiction at any future
point.' If the court had agreed with the Commonwealth's argument, then
juvenile defendants who failed to preserve the jurisdictional issue in cases
involving offenses committed prior to July 1,1996 would be precluded from
raising the issue on appeal.23 The court expressly rejected this contention,
however, ruling that the statute by its own terms addressed only defects in
the transfer bearing, not the "initiation of the juvenile court proceedings."24
The court's ruling did not remedy the failures of the Commonwealth to
adhere to proper procedures for offenses committed prior to July 1, 1996,
thereby allowing defendants convicted of such offenses to raise the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction regardless of whether they properly preserved it.
C. The General Assembly's Solution
Having found only partial relief via the court's ruling in Moore I, the
Commonwealth sought to end the appeals arising from convictions of
juveniles for offenses committed prior to July 1, 1996. The General Assem-
bly enacted section 16.1-272.1 in order to put an end to the effect of Baker.'
The statute reads in part as follows:
any claim of error or defect under this chapter, jurisdictional or
otherwise, that is not raised within one year from the date of final
judgment of the circuit court or one year from the effective date
19. 527 S.E.2d 406 (Va. 2000).
20. Moore (David) v. Commonwealth, 527 S.E.2d 406,411 (Va. 2000); see 1994 Va. Acts
chs. 859, 949.
21. VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-269.6 (Michie 2000).
22. Moore, 527 S.E.2d at 411.
23. In actuality, this argument was an attempt by the Commonwealth to extend the
effect of Moore I to offenses committed prior to July 1, 1996, thus covering all cases in which
the Commonwealth failed to follow statutory procedures. The Commonwealth apparently
believed that section 16.1-269.6(E), at issue inMooreff, should be read in the same manner as
section 16.1-269. 1(E), at issue in Moore L
24. Moore, 527 S.E.2d at 411 (emphasis added).
25. VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-272.1 (Michie 2000).
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of this act, whenever is later, shall not constitute a ground for
relief in any judicial proceeding.2 6
Thus, the Commonwealth has placed a time limit on the appealability of
these matters, assuring that the appeals. will cease and that defendants will
lose the rights earlier granted to them by statute. The statute seems to adopt
the court's view in Moore H that "[b]eyond question, the legislature has the
authority to provide for a waiver of a defect in the transfer proceeding."
27
And so it has done.
D. Juvenile Issues in Capital Murder Cases
The United States Supreme Court in hompson v. Oklahoma28 held that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit execution of a person
under sixteen years of age at the time of the offense.29 In 2000, the Virginia
General Assembly amended section 18.2-10 to comply with the Thompson
holding.3" The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
The authorized punishments for conviction of a felony are: (a) For
Class 1 felonies death, if the person so convicted was sixteen years of
age or older at the time f the offense, or imprisonment for life and
a fine of not more than $100,000. Ifthe person was under
sixteen years of age at the time of the offense, the punishment shall be
imprisonment fo life and... afine of not more than $100,000.
The negative effect of the amendment is that it is proof that the General
Assembly approves of the death penalty for sixteen year old defendants.
Due in part to this show of approval, capital defense attorneys must expect
that more juveniles will be charged with capital murder. Thus, attorneys
must be fully cognizant of juvenile transfer issues like those in Baker, Moore
I and Moore 11 so that timely objections can be raised in order to avoid
procedural default and to protect the rights of juveniles who are charged
with capital murder. 2
26. Id.
27. Moore, 527 S.E.2d at 411.
28. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
29. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion).
30. See 2000 Va. Acts ch. 361 (adding age limitations to the imposition of death).
31. Id. (emphasis in original showing amended language).
32. SeeJohnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769,776-77 (Va. 2000) (discussing Baker
issue and other juvenile transfer issues in capital murder case of defendant who was sixteen
years of age at time of offense). Although the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the
Commonwealth followed the juvenile transfer procedures in this case, attorneys must remain
diligent in ensuring that the Commonwealth abides by its own complex procedures when
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IM. Certificates ofAnalysis: From Strict Compliance /Presumed
Prejudice to No Prejudice
A. Commonwealth Must Adhere Strictly to Statute
Over the past twenty years scientific testing in criminal cases has come
to the forefront as the most important evidence in proving guilt, especially
in drug-related offenses and cases involving fingerprint or DNA analysis.
Due to the frequent use of such analyses in a growing number of cases, the
Virginia General Assembly amended and reenacted section 19.2-187 in 1976
so that the Commonwealth need not produce the lab technicians at trial in
order to present prima facie evidence of the analysis of the substance or
fingerprint.33 The statute, at that time, read in part as follows:
In any hearing or trial of any criminal offense, a certificate of
analysis of a person performing an analysis or examination, per-
formed in [a raboratory in this specified list] when such certificate
is duly attested by such person, shall be admissible in evidence as
evidence of the facts therein stated and the results of the analysis
or examination referred to therein, provided that the certificate of
analysis shall be filed with the clerlk of the court hearing the case
at least seven days prior to the hearing or trial.'
The statute placed the mandatory burden on the Commonwealth (as its
attorneys would receive the certificates) to file the certificate with the clerk
at least a week in advance of trial, thus allowing the defendant's attorney
access to it prior to trial.3" The statute placed no duties whatsoever on the
defendant or his attorney.
This statute was at issue in Gray v. Commonwealth.6 In that case, the
Commonwealth, pursuant to a discovery motion, gave a copy of the certifi-
cate of analysis to the defendant's attorney one month before trial. How-
ever, the Commonwealth did not file the certificate with the clerk of the
circuit court until three days before the trial. 7 Defense counsel objected to
the admission of the certificate at trial based upon the Commonwealth's
failure to adhere to the procedure set out in section 19.2-187; however, the
dealing with juvenile offenders charged with capital murder. Id.
33. 1976 Va. Acts ch. 245.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Gray v. Commonwealth, 265 S.E.2d 705 (Va. 1980).
37. Id. at 706.
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trial court allowed its introduction because the Commonwealth had sup-
plied a copy to the defense, thus preventing any prejudice to the defendant."
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that "in the absence of the pre-
parer of the certificate as a witness at trial, the failure of the Commonwealth
fully to comply with the filing provisions of [sic] 19.2-187 renders the
certificate inadmissible."" The court explained that the "statute deals with
criminal matters, and it undertakes to make admissible evidence which
otherwise might be subject to a valid hearsay objection. Thus, the statute
should be construed strictly against the Commonwealth and in favor of the
accused."' The court went on to emphasize this latter point, adding that the
Commonwealth's act of providing the defense with a copy of the certificate
did not meet the mandatory requirements of the statute and that the accused
need not show any prejudice.4 In his dissent, Judge Thompson noted that
the trial court "concluded that the defendant had not been prejudiced."42
While admitting that the trial court's ruling was erroneous, Judge Thomp-
son stated that he did not believe that it constituted reversible error or called
for a new trial because the defendant was not prejudiced.43
The statute underwent some drastic changes between 1976 and 1984,
all of which favored the defendant." The 1984 amendment specified dearly
that a certificate would be admissible provided that:
(i) the certificate of analysis is filed with the clerk of the court
hearing the case at least seven days prior to the hearing or trial and
(ii) a copy of such certificate is mailed or delivered by the clerk to
counsel 'of record for the accused at least seven days prior to the
hearing or trial upon request of such counsel.4"
The first proviso was a restatement of the previous statute.' The second
proviso placed a mandatory duty on the clerk to mail or deliver a copy to
defense counsel if the defense counsel requested it.4
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 707 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
44. See 1984 Va. Acts ch. 607.
45. Id.
46. See 1976 Va. Acts ch. 245.
47. See id. In addition, the statute added a complete paragraph which read as follows:
The certificate of analysis of any examination conducted by the Division of
Consolidated Laboratory Services relating to a controlled substance or mari.
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This statute was in effect when the Court of Appeals of Virginia
decided Allen v. Commonwealth.' In Allen, the Commonwealth filed the
certificates in the general district court for the preliminary hearing, but did
not file them with the circuit court within seven days prior to trial. 9 The
Court of Appeils held that admission of the certificates was error because
they had not been filed in the court that was hearing the case as mandated
by section 19.2-187.' "In the absence of strict compliance, the evidence was
inadmissible and prejudice to the defendant is presumed.""' Thus it ap-
peared that the court continued to follow its previous holdings that strict
compliance by the Commonwealth was necessary. 2
The Court of Appeals of Virginia continued to favor strict compliance
as is evident by its decision in Nonnemacker v. Commonwealth. The
stamps that appeared on the certificates showed only that the certificates had
been filed in the general district court; thus the defendant objected that the
certificates were not timely filed in the court hearing the case." The trial
court allowed two clerks to testify, over defense counsel's vehement objec-
tions, that the Commonwealth had filed the certificates but that the clerks
had failed to file them properly."5 The appellate court held that the certifi-
cates were inadmissible as evidence because they were not properly attested
as required by section 19.2-187, nor was there any evidence of when the
Commonwealth filed the copies with the clerk of the circuit court.'
B. The See-Saw of Burden.Shifting Begins
Only three months after its decision in Nonnemacker, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia began to show signs of retreating from its view that the
Commonwealth must adhere strictly to section 19.2-187. In Burns v. Com-
juana shall be mailed or forwarded by personnel of the Division of Consoli-
dated Laboratory Services to the Commonwealth's attorney of the jurisdiction
where such offinse may be heard. The Commonwealth's attorney shall
acknowledge receipt of the certificate on forms provided by the laboratory.
1984 Va. Acts ch. 607.
48. Allen v. Commonwealth, 353 S.E.2d 162 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
49. Id. at 165.
50. Id. at 166.
51. Id. (citing Gray v. Commonwealth, 265 S.E.2d 705, 706 (Va. 1980)).
52. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.?
53. Nonnemacker v. Commonwealth, No. 0367-88-2, 1990 WL 746769, at *2 (Va. Ct.
App. Sept. 11, 1990) (unpublished opinion).
54. Id., at *1.
55. Id., at *1-2.
56. Id., at *2.
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monwealths7 the certificates were filed with the clerk in a timely manner but,
although they were "filed in the defendant's files, [they] were not filed in the
correct ones." 8 The court held that such a filing satisfied the statute because
"the statute does not provide where in the clerk's office the certificates are
to be filed," only that they be filed. 9 The court also added that "the record
does not reflect that the defendant was harmed in any manner by the way
the certificates were filed."60 Although the court was correct in stating that
the statute did not require the certificates to be filed correctly, its additional
comment about lack of prejudice reveals that the court's attitude concerning
"presumed prejudice" was beginning to change.6'
In Stokes v. Commonwealth' the Court of Appeals of Virginia contin-
ued to back away from its early standpoint of strictly construing section
19.2-187 against the Commonwealth.3 In that case the court held that the
Commonwealth was not required to show that it had fulfilled the require-
ments of the second paragraph of section 19.2-187, namely that "the attor-
ney for the Commonwealth shall acknowledge receipt of the certificate
[from the laboratory] on forms provided by the laboratory."' In its ruling
the court distinguished the first and second paragraphs as follows:
[The purpose of the provisos of the first paragra ph] is to ensure
that the certificate to be used in evidence is lodged timely in a
secure and appropriate place, accessible to the accused, and avail-
able to him upon request. The second paragraph ... serves an
entirely different purpose. It provides Tor the coordination of
governmental agencies to facilitate the development of his case by
te commonwealth's attorney.5
57. No. 1571-894, 1990 WL 746758, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1990) (unpublished
opinion).
58. Burns v. Commonwealth, No. 1571-89-4,1990WL 746758, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec.
11, 1990) (unpublished opinion).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Cf. Harshaw v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 733,735 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that Commonwealth fully complied with statute although certificates were placed in file not
related to the specific charge, but declining to address certificate's admissibility if it were filed
in such a way that denied defendant statutory protections).
62. 399 S.E.2d 453 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
63. Stokes v. Commonwealth, 399 S.E.2d 453 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
64. Id. at 454.
65. Id.
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
This reading of the court cannot be said to be construed strictly against the
Commonwealth; it is a reading that justified the Commonwealth's failure
to adhere to the procedures set out in section 19.2-187.
Given the appellate court's lax reading of the statute in the few years
prior, its decision in Petit Frere v. Commonwealth" is noteworthy.' In that
case the court held that "in order to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule, a certificate introduced under Code [section] 19.2-187 must
bear the examiner's signature as part of an attestation clause included on the
certificate."" The court noted that the statute was ambiguous in that it
could be read to favor either the Commonwealth or the defendant. 9 In
favoring the defendant's reading, the court re-asserted that the statute must
be construed strictly against the Commonwealth and in favor of the defen-
dant because it deals with criminal matters and evidentiary concerns.70
Thus, it appeared that the court was returning to its previous belief that the
Commonwealth must adhere strictly to the statute in order for the certifi-
cates to be admissible.
7
1
Later in 1995, the Court of Appeals of Virginia continued to enforce
the statute when it reversed the trial court in Bottoms v. Commonwealth."2
The defendant requested a copy of the certificate of blood analysis from the
derk of the circuit court."' The defendant did not receive a copy before trial
and objected when the Commonwealth moved for a continuance so that
defense counsel could read it.74 Again the defendant objected to the continu-
ance, citing that it would prejudice his case.7" The trial court overruled the
objections and allowed the Commonwealth to introduce the certificate. 6
The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the certificate was inadmissible
because the Commonwealth failed to comply strictly with section 19.2-
66. 452 S.E.2d 682 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
67. See Petit Frere v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 682 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
68. Id. at 686.
69. Id. at 685.
70. Id.
71. Seeao Payne v. Commonwealth, No. 2870-95-4, 1997 WL 133294, at *1-2 (Va. Ct.
App. Mar. 25, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (holding that certificate was inadmissible as it
lacked requisite attestation clause as required by statute).
72. Bottoms v. Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 796 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
73. Id. at 796. Note that the court mentioned that the defendant did not notify the
Commonwealth's attorney of the request, although nothing in section 19.2-187 at that time
required such notice. Id.




2000] LIMITATION OF DEFENDANTS' STATUTORY RIGHTS 47
187."p The court noted that a "continuance of any length after the trial had
begun would not have remedied the Commonwealth's non-compliance"
because "19.2-187(ii) requires that the certificate be mailed or delivered to
counsel 'at least seven days prior to ... trial.'""
Another case in favor of strict compliance with the statute was Hughes
v. Commonwealth."9 The clerk failed to mail a copy of the certificate to
defense counsel prior to the trial. The court granted the Commonwealth
a brief recess and the trial resumed with the testimony of the officer who
had filled out the breath test analysis. Over defendant's objection, the court
admitted the certificate into evidence.80 The appellate court held that the
certificate was inadmissible because the clerk did not mail a copy of the
certificate to defense counsel.8' Thus, the officer's testimony was hearsay
and could not render the certificate admissible.
82
In less than one year, however, the appellate court returned to its broad
reading that gave deference to the Commonwealth's failures to comply fully
with the statute. In Coleman v. Commonwealth,83 the defendant asked for
a copy of the certificate pursuant to a discovery motion.84 He signed an
order acknowledging that he would appear at the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney's office at a certain date and time to effect all discovery for the case.8"
Neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared for that meeting. The court
admitted the certificate into evidence over the defendant's objection that he
did not receive a copy of it. 6
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that defendant's endorsement
of the discovery order bound him to the order "for all matters of discovery,
including the request in appellant's discovery motion for any certificate of
analysis."" Justifying its ruling, the court stated that the defendant "never
made a direct request for the certificate of analysis under Code [section]
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting 1995 Va. Acts ch. 437). But see Johnson v. Commonwealth, No. 1573-
89-3, 1991 WL 832815, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1991) (unpublished opinion) (noting that
court could grant continuance so that Commonwealth could comply with section 19.2-187).
79. Hughes v. Commonwealth, No. 2802-96-4, 1997 WL 727730, at *2 (Va. Ct. App.
Nov. 25, 1997) (unpublished opinion).
80. Id., at* 1.
81. Id., at* 2.
82. Id.
83. 501 S.E.2d 461 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
84. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 501 S.E.2d 461, 462 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
85. Id. at 462.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 464-65.
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
19.2-187, which specifically provides that the request be made to the clerk
of the circuit court or to the attorney for the Commonwealth.""8 The
defendant's discovery motion, filed in the circuit court, read in part as
follows: "Pursuant to Section 19.2-187 of the Code of Virginia, the defen-
dant further requests that he be provided a copy of any certificate of analysis
which the Commonwealth intends to introduce at trial."8 9 According to the
court's ruling, this request was not enough to comply with the statute.
However, the court noted three ways for the defendant to obtain the
certificate:
[The defendant] could have: (1) requested it under the terms of
Code [section] 19.2-187(ii) directly Trom the clerk of the circuit
court or from the attorney for the Commonwealth; (2) made a
motion for discovery under Rule 3A: 11 to the court to order the
Commonwealth to permit him to inspect and copy or photograph
designated documents, including scientific reports; and (3) called
upon the Commonwealth to produce the exculpatory evidence
under Brady v. Maryland.'
This statement by the court nullified the mandatory language of section
19.2-187. Thus, the see-saw had again teetered to the side of the Common-
wealth when the court read the statute in such a way that favored the
Commonwealth instead of the alternate reading which would have favored
the defendant.9
C. The General Assembly Finalizes the Burden-Shift
On April 3, 2000, the General Assembly approved an amendment to
section 19.2-187.92 The amendment added the following to the second
proviso of the first paragraph: "The request [by defense counsel] shall be in
writing at least ten days prior to trial and shall clearly state in its heading
'Request for Copy of Certificate of Analysis.' 93 Given this addition, the
burden to obtain a copy of the certificate of analysis now completely rests
on the shoulders of defense counsel. Without making the specific request
for the certificate with the specific heading laid out in the statute, the
88. Id. at 464.
89. Id. at 462.
90. Id. at 463; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that prosecutorial
suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process).
91. The court noted that the defendant did not "claim that the certificate was not
timely filed in the circuit court." Coleman, 501 S.E.2d at 463 n.1. This statement implies that
the Commonwealth failed to file a copy of the certificate with the clerk.
92. 2000 Va. Acts ch. 336.
93. Id.
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defense will not be entitled to the protections originally contemplated by
this statute. This amendment no longer resembles section 19.2-187 as it was
known in 1976."' The earlier version placed no burden whatsoever on the
defense; the new version places the entire burden on the defense.
D. The Role of Forensic Evidence in Capital Murder Cases
The use of forensic evidence in capital murder cases does not differ
significantly from the use of such evidence in non-capital cases. Capital
defense attorneys must follow the procedures set out in section 19.2-187 in
order to object timely to any improper introduction of test results into
evidence. Although no reported capital murder case at present deals specifi-
cally with section 19.2-187 at the appellate level, the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Johnson v. Commonweahlp noted that:
under Code [section] 19.2-187.01, an attested report of analysis
from the Division of Forensic Science is prima faie evidence of
custody from the time a sample is receivedfby the laboratory until
it is released after testing. Johnson presented no evidence to
overcome the Commonwealth's intr ction of this prima facie
evidence, or the direct evidence of actual custody of the blood
sample.
9e
Like section 19.2-187, section 19.2-187.01 favors the Commonwealth in that
the defendant must overcome the presumption that the Commonwealth has
established a chain of custody with regard to forensic evidence. Due to the
damning effect of this type of evidence, capital defense attorneys must be
ready to argue against its introduction and can only do so by overcoming
the high hurdle of section 19.2-187. 97
IV Procedure for Sentencing in Non-Capital Felonies
A. Mandatory Language Interpreted as Precatory Language
In 1994 the Virginia General Assembly enacted section 19.2-295.1. 91
Prior to this statute the Commonwealth could argue for a sentence within
94. 1976 Va. Acts ch. 245.
95. 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000).
96. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 783 (Va. 2000).
97. Johnson involved a "cold DNA hit," meaning that the Commonwealth compared
DNA evidence from an old crime with DNA evidence on file at Virginia's DNA Data Bank
and matched blood and other evidence from the crime scene with Johnson. Id. at 774-75.
These "cold hit" cases will only grow in number as the data bank increases in volume so
defense attorneys must recognize the importance of section 19.2-187 and all other procedures
involving the introduction of forensic evidence at trial.
98. 1994 Va. Acts chs. 828, 860, 862, 881.
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statutory guidelines provided that the conviction was based solely on guilt."
By enacting this statute the Commonwealth made "more information
available to the jury and [enlarged] its traditional role in ascertaining
punishment."1" The additional information consisted of the defendant's
prior criminal convictions. The statute read in pertinent part as follows:
In cases of a trial by jury, upon a finding that the defendant is
guilty of a felony, a separate proceeding linited to the ascertain-
ment of punishment shall be field as soon as practicable before the
same jury. At such proceeding, the Commonwealth shall present
the defendant's prior criminal convictions by certified, attested or
exemplified copies of the record of conviction... The Common-
wealth shall provide to the defendant fourteen days prior to trial
photocopies of certified copies of the defendant's prior criminal
convictions which it intends to introduce at sentencing." 1
Although the statute favored the Commonwealth by permitting the intro-
duction of the defendant's convictions, the plain language of the statute
placed the burden on the Commonwealth to provide the defense with
copies of the convictions that the Commonwealth intended to introduce
during the sentencing proceeding. 02
This statute was in effect when the Court of Appeals of Virginia
decided Evans v. Commonwealth. 3 The defendant objected to the introduc-
tion of a record of conviction pursuant to section 19.2-295.1."° The record
was in reality a copy of the front side of an arrest warrant related to a
previous charge of which the defendant had been convicted. The trial court
admitted it into evidence because it gave the defendant notice that the
Commonwealth intended to introduce that prior conviction during sentenc-
ing.10 The appellate court not only agreed with the trial court's ruling, but
also bolstered it, holding that section 19.2-295.1 was procedural in nature
and that precise compliance was not essential provided that the defendant
99. See Martinez v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 358, 360 (Va. 1991) (holding that
Commonwealth's request for a specific sentence during dosing argument was not improper
as it was within statutory guidelines and conviction was basedsolely on guilt).
100. JOHN L. COsTELLO, ViRGInIA CRiMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE S 63.1 (2d ed.
1995).
101. 1994 Va. Acts chs. 828, 860, 862, 881.
102. See generally Thomas D. Horne, Some Thoughts on Bifurcated Sentencing in Non.
CapitalFelony Cases in Virginia, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 465 (1996) (discussing 19.2-295.1 and its
effects on sentencing in non-capital felony cases).
103. Evans v. Commonwealth, No. 0870-95-2, 1996VWL 145764, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Apr.
2, 1996) (unpublished opinion).
104. Id., at *1.
105. Id.
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received notice that the Commonwealth intended to introduce the previous
conviction. " The copies of arrest warrants were not records of conviction,
but the court's holding shows that the court gave no meaning to the plain
language of the statute."'0
In 1995 the General Assembly amended section 19.2-295.1.",8 The
amendment added more responsibilities to the Commonwealth. It read in
part as follows:
The Commonwealth shall provide the defendant fourteen days
prior to trial notice of its intention to introduce evidence of the
lefendant's prior criminal convictions. Such notice shall include
(i) the date of each prior conviction, (ii) the name and jurisdiction
of the court where each prior conviction was had, and (iii) each
offense of which he was convicted."°
This amendment enumerated clearly that the Commonwealth's notice to
the defendant must be specific and complete.'
This version of the statue was at issue in the case of Lebedun v. Com-
monwealth."' In this case, the Commonwealth sent notice to the defense
that it would seek to admit prior convictions of the defendant from Mary-
land during the sentencing phase. The notices, however, contained incor-
rect dates of the prior convictions."2 The trial court permitted the Com-
monwealth to introduce these prior convictions pursuant to 19.2-295.1.'
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that "[t]he Commonwealth's
failure to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Code [sec-
tion] 19.2-295.1 violated no substantive right and did not prejudice
Lebedun's ability to contest the validity of the convictions.""' In so hold
ing, the court reiterated that this section is procedural, not substantive, and
its "notice provisions are merely directory.""' Thus, although the 1995
amendment added mandatory provisions listing the items that the Com-
monwealth's notice must contain, the court refused to read "shall" as man-
106. Id.
107. See infra part IV(B) for cases concerning "record of conviction."
108. 1995 Va. Acts ch. 567.
109. Id.
110. Note that the three subsections are joined by "and."
111. Lebedun v. Commonwealth, 501 S.E.2d 427 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
112. Id. at 436.




datory language." 6 Likewise the court did not mention what it would hold
if the incorrect dates contained in the notice would have prejudiced the
defendant, such as causing him to be unable to recall those specific convic-
tions in order to obtain more information about them.
B. The Changing Definition of"Record of Conviction"
"The Commonwealth shall present the defendant's prior criminal
convictions by certified, attested or exemplified copies of the record of
conviction, including adult convictions and juvenile convictions and adjudi-
cations of delinquency."" 7 This hrasing of section 19.2-295.1 has not
changed since its inception in 1994.118 However, the section does not define
"record of conviction." Therefore, no complete guidelines existed for the
Commonwealth to follow with regards to its notification to the defendant.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia confronted the issue of how to define
"record of conviction" in Davis v. Commonwealth."' In this case the appel-
lant argued that "his prior sentences and the fact he was in custody at the
time of his prior convictions should have been redacted from the conviction
orders submitted to the jury during the sentencing phase."' 0 The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's aecision to submit all of this information to
the jury.' The court stated that "[ijn Virginia, the record of conviction is
the trial court's sentencing order. The entire order, including the sentence
imposed, is the record of conviction."' While the court's broad definition
of "record of conviction" did not favor this appellant, it did seem to draw
a bright-line rule for what constituted a "record of conviction" and fore-*
casted that the court would apply this rule in future cases.
The definition became more murky due to the appellate court's deci-
sion in Folson v. Commonwealth.23 In that case, the Commonwealth intro-
duced documents that it received from Maryland concerning previous
charges of the defendant. The documents included a copy of an indictment,
a document entitled "docket entries," and a "commitment record." The
116. See Bender v. Commonwealth, No. 0176-98-1, 1999 WL 1126376, at *3 (Va. Ct.
App. Feb. 23, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (holding that Commonwealth substantially
complied with statute although dates of prior convictions contained in notice were incorrect).
117. 1994 Va. Acts chs. 828, 860, 862, 881 (emphasis added).
118. See 1996 Va. Acts 664 (the last date of amendment of this statute).
119. Davis v. Commonwealth, No. 0126-95-4, 1996 WI. 22365, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan.
23, 1996) (unpublished opinion).
120. Id., at *1.
121. Id.
122. Id. (internal citations omitted).
123. Folson v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 316 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
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defendant objected to the admission of the documents, arguing that they
were not "records of conviction."'24
The appellate court held that "'record of conviction' means a 'record'
evidencing the fact of conviction." 2 ' It added that "[w]hile a final order of
conviction may be the most expedient means of establishing a 'record of
conviction,' we do not find Code [section] 19.2-295.1 limited to such
evidence."'26 Using this definition, the Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld
the trial court's ruling that the documents introduced at sentencing were
"records of conviction."' Although Davis is unpublished and is not bind-
ing authority, the change in attitude by the court in the ten months between
Davis and Folson cannot be overlooked. 2 s
C. The Merging of Non-Capital Felonies and Capital Murder
A large number of capital murder defendants also face charges of
underlying felonies in the same case. Thus, capital defense attorneys must
be able to cope with the added complexities of sentencing for both capital
and non-capital offenses during the sentencing phase. 29 For purposes of
capital sentencing, the Commonwealth may introduce evidence of the
defendant's unadjudicated prior criminal conduct pursuant to Virginia Code
section 19.2-264.3:2.13 The statute provides that
the attorney for the Commonwealth shall give notice in writing
to the attorney for the defendant of such ifitention. The notice
shall include a description of the alleged unadjudicated criminal
conduct and, to the extent such information is available, the time
and place such conduct will be alleged to have occurred. The
court shall specify the time by which such notice shall be given.'
3
1
124. Id. at 317-18.
125. Id. at 318.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. The Court of Appeals of Virginia does recognize some limit to the expansion of
what constitutes a "conviction* and a "record of conviction." See Webb v. Commonwealth,
524 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a fimding of guilt without an entry of
final sentence was not admissible during sentencing as a "record of conviction*); see also Byrd
v. Commonwealth, 517 S.E.2d 243, 245-46 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that admission of
evidence concerning nolle prossed charges during sentencing phase was error, but harmless).
129. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3 (Michie 2000) (setting out sentencing procedure
in capital cases and noting that S 19.2-295.1 controls sentencing of non-capital convictions).
130. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie 2000).
131. Id.
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This notice provision bears a resemblance to the original version of section
19.2-295.1 in that it places the burden on the Commonwealth to give notice
to the defense. '2 In order to ensure that the Commonwealth fully complies
with the notice provision set forth in section 19.2-264.3:2, capital defense
attorneys should move the trial court in a pre-trial motion to instruct the
Commonwealth to provide notice of any unadjudicated criminal conduct
that the Commonwealth intends to introduce during the capital sentencing
phase. The defense attorney must also decide whether she should move the
court to change the order of sentencing of capital and non-capital felonies
so that the jury cannot consider unadjudicated criminal conduct before
sentencing the non-capital felonies.' Above all, the lessons of the evolution
of the notice provision of section 19.2-295.1 should alert capital defense
attorneys to the fact that the notice provision of section 19.2-264.3:2 may
be construed in a manner detrimental to defendants."4
V Conclusion
As this article demonstrates, the past twenty years "in the Common-
wealth have consisted of a continuous process of the narrowing of a criminal
defendant's statutory rights, the same rights that the Commonwealth itself
had guaranteed defendants. The courts have interpreted statutes broadly in
favor of criminal defendants and then have regressed, gradually shifting the
burdens to the defendants. The General Assembly has sought to amend
statutes in reaction to and in conjunction with the courts' narrowing inter-
pretations. The combination has been effective.
Battling this two-headed juggernaut is an uphill battle for defense
attorneys. They must strive to stay well-informed about the ever-changing
statutes and standards while simultaneously coping with the current statutes
and case law. As mentioned earlier, subtle changes in statutes or new
statutes can nullify previous statutes that guaranteed rights to defendants. 3 '
Advocacy and ethics demand that attorneys are not only familiar with such
statutes, but also that the attorneys comply with mandates of the statutes so
that their clients do not suffer the consequences. All of the statutes dis-
cussed in this article have been and will continue to be at issue in capital
cases. Thus, capital defense attorneys have the added burden of being fully
conversant not only with those statutes that we consider quintessential to
capital murder trials, but also with any statute generally applicable.
132. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
133. Capital defense attorneys may contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for
aid in these sentencing issues.
134. See supra parts IV(A)-(C).
135. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13:1
